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Abstract: Critical infrastructure (CI) is vital for the overall economic growth and its reliable and safe operation is essential for a
nation's stability and people's safety. Proper operation of the assets is essential for such a system and any threats that could
negatively impact the asset could have a severe disruption. Risk management is an important aspect of the protection of CI.
There are several frameworks and methodologies for identifying assets, quantifying and analysing vulnerabilities. However,
there is a lack of focus on the interdependencies among the assets and cascading effect of the inherent vulnerabilities on the
asset. This study attempts to bridge that gap by presenting a novel asset focus risk management approach for the CI. It
presents a systematic methodology for identifying and analysing critical assets, their potential vulnerabilities, threats and risks
facing CI. This work taking into account cascading vulnerability impacts on assets leading to threats and causing risk. The
authors use a running example from a smart grid system to demonstrate the usability of the approach. The result shows that
some assets are prioritised and more vulnerable than other assets for the power grid system and it can severely impact on the
overall business continuity.
1 Introduction
Critical Infrastructure (CI) organisations comprise of critical assets
such as information technology (IT) hardware, software,
environmental, facilities, technology, networks, services, people
and complex processes inter-related with other to support the
overall business. Due to its inherent complex nature of technology
and its interaction with people and systems consisting of multiple,
distributed, and independently operating systems [1], it faces
different security threats including cybersecurity threats, physical
attack, etc. which could lead to any potential risks. Risks are
associated with all aspects of CI, as it is the probability of loss [2]
or an uncertain event that may occur and influence the
organisation's achievement on strategic, operational, and financial
objectives [3]. The cybersecurity threat is one of the most urgent
issues in the CI organisation, its networks and associated assets and
vulnerabilities [4]. It is necessary to identify the assets, prioritising
them based on their dependencies to support the overall business so
that adequate protection can be implemented to protect the assets.
An effective risk management practice is necessary for this
purpose. There are existing risk management methods and
standards such as ISO 31000:2018 that embodies the identification,
analysis, planning, tracking, controlling, and communication of
risk which gives a structured mechanism to provide visibility of the
risks in order to achieve the organisation's success [5]. However,
there is a lack of focus on identifying and analysing cascading
effects from vulnerability to threat and risks.
The novel contribution of this paper is an asset focus risk
management framework that identifies the assets and their
vulnerabilities and analyses possible vulnerabilities by showing
their cascading effects on the assets and contribution to the threat
and risks. We follow concepts relating to the asset, threat, and risks
and use a systematic process to identify and prioritise the assets
and vulnerabilities. The assets and risks are analysed through the
cascading effect of vulnerabilities to the asset and cause the risks.
This certainly helps the CI organisation to mitigate the
vulnerabilities and risks by using suitable controls in a proactive
way. We use a running example of a power grid system to
demonstrate the applicability of the work. The results show that the
proposed approach effectively identifies vulnerabilities of the
assets and analyse the risks through the cascading influence of
vulnerabilities on the assets.
2 Related work
There are works in literature that have been proposed on
identifying assets, their potential vulnerabilities, possible threat
outcomes, risk, and risk assessment but has not been systematically
addressed. Izuakor and White [6] proposed a new approach for CI
asset identification using multi-criteria decision theory to resolve
the challenges of identifying critical assets. The approach did not
provide a systematic process for arriving at a critical decision.
Bialas [7] proposed a novel structured risk management approach
on how to deal with internal and external impacts of a hazardous
event which occurred in the given CI. It followed an ISO31000
standard of risk monitoring and risk communication. This paper
additionally takes into account interdependencies. The paper did
not provide a guideline for determining risk levels and control
mitigations. Fekete [8] described how society gets to choose what
is critical to them, based on how much influence it has on them.
This shows how to identify what is critical with regard to the fact
that there cannot be full protection with respect to cascading effects
and threats. The paper focuses less on threat prevention rather than
the impacts of threats. Strategic proactive planning, the purpose of
civil protection and activities of risk management are among the
key attributes of identifying the above. The authors in [9] analysed
a telecommunication system by adopting unified modelling
language (UML) to build a model named TVRA model for the
telecommunication system which also made a systematic analysis
about the security objectives, assets, weaknesses, unwanted
incidents, threats. Clarizia et al.[10] proposed a multi-level graph
approach that collects and analyses data from sensors within a city
using context dimension tree, ontologies, and baysian belief
networks for the purpose of decision-making. The underlying
system architecture data collection, context, and interface engine.
However, to improve its performance knowledge sharing and
exchanging is important. Wang and Liu [11] extended in their work
a new attribute ‘location’ and proposed a comprehensive
vulnerability analysis model for internet protocol (IP) Multimedia
Subsystem (IMS) network. They could identify weaknesses in the
IMS system, therefore, making the system vulnerable, but did not
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focus on how to reduce those weaknesses. This new model also
tried to focus on all the assets and treating them as equal. The asset
identification aspect of this model did not identify the most critical
assets of the system. Ramakrishnan and Sekar [12] proposed a
novel technique to identify vulnerabilities that arise from
unexpected interactions between system components. The
behaviour of each system component is modelled in high-level
specification language to obtain possible behaviours of an entire
system. The behaviours are further analysed to find vulnerabilities
within the system by using automated verification techniques to
identify scenarios where security-related properties are violated.
Ezell [13] presented a model that quantifies vulnerability by using
the Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model and applied it to
a medium-sized clean water system. This paper did not identify
assets but rather quantified vulnerabilities of the overall system.
Cherdantseva [14] reviewed the state of the art in cybersecurity
risk assessment of the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems. In the work, many risk assessment methods
developed or applied in the context of a SCADA system were
examined. These various methods were analysed in terms of aim,
application domain, stages of risk management, risk management
concepts, impact measurement, and sources of probabilistic data,
evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis of an intuitive
scheme for the categorisation of cybersecurity risk assessment
methods for SCADA systems was suggested.
McQueen et al. [15] proposed a model for estimating the time
to compromise a system component that is visible to an attacker.
The model provides an estimate of the expected value of the time-
to-compromise as a function of known and visible vulnerabilities,
and attacker skill level. The model was used to aid in risk reduction
estimate between a SCADA system and baseline system. In the
work of McQueen et al. [16], risk reduction on a partial SCADA
system was carried out and a methodology was developed for
obtaining quantitative risk reduction estimation. The methodology
applied a graph theoretical approach which was described in ten
steps. McQueen et al. [15] discussed the specific methods used in
step six of the methodology, estimating the time-to-compromise.
There are standards such as the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) established the cybersecurity standards for CI
protection (CIP-002 through CIP 009) to provide a security
framework for the identification and protection of critical cyber
assets that support the reliable operation of the electric power grid
[17]. National Institute of standards and technology (NIST)
developed the cybersecurity framework to enhance the security and
resilience of a nations CI [18]. NIST provides a risk management
framework to improve information security, strengthen risk
management processes, and encourage its adoption among
organisations.
All these works justify the necessity and importance of
identifying critical assets and vulnerabilities of the assets of CI.
However, we have made several observations. In particular, there is
a lack of systematic approach that supports CI organisation by
identifying critical assets and their vulnerabilities and cascading
effect of the vulnerabilities on the assets. Furthermore, most of the
risk management process emphasises more on vulnerability
assessment for CI rather than on identifying critical assets before
assessing vulnerability. The novel contribution of our work is a
systematic asset identification and vulnerability assessment
approach for CI risk management taking into account the cascading
effect of vulnerability on the threat and risk.
3 Running example
This section provides an overview of the running example power
grid SCADA system used by our work. The system is composed of
three main components, i.e. power plant, transmission substation,
and distribution grid. The power grid is a network of power lines
and associated equipment used to transmit and distribute electricity
over a geographic area. Such facilities include transportation,
communication systems, water, electricity, and public institutions
like schools, hospitals, post offices, and even prisons [19]. The
cyber-physical systems of the electric sector include industrial
control systems (ICS), which allow digital control of the physical
operations of equipment. Where generation machinery such as
turbines was once only mechanically operated, equipment is now
mostly protected and controlled by ICS synchronously, by
automation and sometimes remotely. These technological
improvements have caused most power grids to be increasingly
vulnerable to intrusions from cyberspace. Modernisation efforts of
older grid system components to incorporate new digital
automation, or smart grid technologies, have introduced a greater
number of IP enabled access points to grid network [20].
The integration of IT and operational technology in ICS
expands the cyber threat landscape by introducing several threat
vectors as consequences of the greater connectivity of systems.
Networks can become less secure over time, often being
reconfigured to allow one-time access for a particular need or
convenience and never being appropriately restored. Remotely
accessible equipment is further vulnerable to public discovery via
unprotected networks or the internet. According to Amin [21], each
system of the US power grid (generation, transmission, and
distribution) poses analogous and distinct vulnerabilities to the
reliable delivery of electricity via cyber-physical assets.
4 Risk management framework
The proposed framework includes a conceptual view risk
management areas and process to support the risk management
activities. This section provides an overview of the approach.
4.1 Conceptual view
The proposed framework includes a set of modelling concepts that
are essential to understand, manage, and express cybersecurity
risks. We have identified a few concepts necessary for the
development of the cybersecurity risk management framework that
will put into consideration the cascading impact. Based on those
concepts, an in-depth exploration of the numerous methods, tools,
and techniques that can be used for a risk management framework
in CI organisation has been performed. An overview of the
concepts used for the proposed framework is explained below
Assets: assets are the tangible or intangible entities which are
necessary and have values to the organisation. Identification of
critical assets and putting a value on each critical asset is an
important process of risk management.
Threat actor: threat actor is a group, organisation or individual
operating with malicious intent. They are characterised by their
location, skills, and resources used to generate a cyber-attack
within the organisation as shown in Fig. 1. All the information
about the threat actor should be available for risk identification and
mitigation. 
Vulnerabilities and threat: vulnerability is the weakness in an
asset that is exploited by a threat actor. The threat is the
unauthorised access to an asset as a result of a vulnerability in an
asset that is been exploited by a threat actor.
Risks: Risk in the case of a CI organisation is the probable
failure of an organisation to fulfil its goals such as confidentiality,
integrity or availability due to the probability of a threat actor
obstructing its goals.
Fig. 1  Threat actor profile
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The concepts are linked with each other through activities to
support asset identification, vulnerability assessment, threat
identification, risk assessment and deal with cascading effect as
shown in Fig. 2. Assets are necessary for CI organisations to
operate and needs to be kept secure for the continuity of the
business, but these assets are prone to weaknesses in their systems
known as vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are exploited by
threat actors to attack the asset and when not addressed on time can
influence a threat which introduces risk and this risk is likely to
lead to the exploitation of the assets. Once the risk factors have
been identified, risk assessment is carried out to mitigate them. 
4.2 Process
The process comprises of a systematic collection of activities
which are linked with each other to support specific tasks relating
to risk management. We follow the guidelines identified in the
existing risk management standards ISO 310000 [22], NIST
SP800-30 framework [23], and NERC CIP standards [17] to define
the process. In particular, the main focus is to understand the asset,
vulnerabilities, and threats that can lead to risk for CI organisation.
4.2.1 Activity 1-assets identification and categorisation: For
successful risk management, asset identification is crucial and
needs to be initiated before any risk is identified. The purpose of
asset identification is to identify and prioritise assets according to
their criticality levels in the organisation. The resulting asset list
and categorisation are then used as input to vulnerability
assessment. Identification of critical assets is necessary to protect
against cyber-attacks and consequential destruction. CI consists of
critical assets that are absolutely necessary for its stable and
reliable functioning of the organisation and cyber-attacks could
have catastrophic consequences, such as loss of power or shortage
of water supply. Examples include Shamoon [24], a computer virus
that struck a Saudi Arabia oil company's Windows-based
computers as many as 30,000, operating on the company's network.
This disrupted the company's business operations, thereby causing
data loss and disabled workstations. Stuxnet [24], a malicious
computer worm that targeted the SCADA systems, altered and
caused damages to the Iranian nuclear program. Ukraine
experienced a total blackout as a result of cyber-attack on the
power grid. Adversaries that successfully loaded malicious
firmware into the SCADA network field gateway devices
compromising its information systems and temporarily disrupting
electricity supply to the end consumers [25].
This activity identifies the most critical assets of CI following a
systematic approach using the asset focus. These assets are
prioritised based on their impact on the organisation. This provides
an understanding of what a critical asset is and how to secure it
from a cyber-attack. For this activity to be efficient, it is necessary
to include and engage the relevant stakeholders within the
organisation, as they are the ones with insights into the system and
capable of determining asset types, asset impact types, and the
required level of protection necessary for each asset, including the
sensitivity and value of a particular asset. The final task of this
activity is attaining critical assets which is done based on the
output generated from previous tasks.
Task 1A– identify assets: asset identification is the first step in
any risk management process. Identifying key assets of a CI
organisation and putting a value on each key asset is an important
process of risk management. These key assets could be data,
software, hardware, SCADA systems, and communications, and
networks as shown in Fig. 3. Critical assets are defined as assets
with a high consequence and high probability of failure, therefore,
it is important to identify critical assets as well as estimate their
critical failure modes or impact of the loss. This task identifies
critical assets by looking at the following three steps: 
Step 1 – Asset focus: asset focus refers to the specific assets to
be considered for vulnerability and threat assessment as well as
risk analysis because assets that comprise our CIs are not evenly
critical. The asset focus is to be considered are software assets –
program or application used by CI organisations for its business
activities. If such assets are not managed properly, they may
involve in compliance risks, threats to corporate reputation and
even its existence. Data assets – they are information stored and
used by a computer system. Hardware assets – they are the
collection of physical components of a computer system,
communication, and network.
Step 2 – Determine goals and key performance indicators
(KPIs): this step identifies the organisational goals for the CI in
terms of security and organisational context. The main goals are in
general confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Based on these
goals the KPIs for the organisational context are considered. It is
also necessary to identify the key operational responsibilities of the
CI in order to support cybersecurity activities. KPI plays an
integral role in risk management. They have the benefits and
targets set my organisations and these goals must be achieved. KPI
is given a range between 1 and 0. Secure CI should be able to
provide the below KPI conditions
• Confidentiality (C): this KPI deals with the disclosure of
sensitive data against unauthorised users, CI internal users,
external users, and malicious attackers. It involves the deletion
and transfer of data between authorised users in a secure
environment to prevent data leakage. One of the simplest
methods to provide confidentiality is to install encryption/
decryption components at both ends of an unsecured connection
[26].
• High availability (A): availability refers to ensuring that the
assets of the CI are made available and accessible to the end
users as agreed or when and where they need it. It defines the
degree or extent to which the asset is readily usable along with
the necessary IT and management procedures, tools, and
technologies required to enable, manage, and continue to make
it available. This requirement of the CI security is very
important and one of the primary objective to ensure the reliable
operation of the assets. Generally, availability refers to the
timely and reliable access to the use of CI assets and the
capacity to access the assets even under the most critical
situations.
• Integrity (I): integrity refers to the ability of the CI organisations
assets to perform its required functions effectively and
efficiently without any disruption or loss of its services. It
includes the critical aspect of any asset which stores, processes,
and retrieves data its design, implementation, and usage.
Integrity ensures that the data managed by systems and
messages communicated over the network are not altered by
unauthorised users.
• Reliability (R): this KPI allows for the CI to be able to work on
an acceptable level of efficiency and consistently well even
when external or internal disturbances occur.
• Authorisation (ATH): this KPI allows the organisation to specify
access rights and privileges to resources related to the
information of a particular actor.
• Authenticity (AUT): this KPI improves the identification and
verification technology of an authorised user in order to provide
security, ease of use, and administration. It has the capacity to
identify an authorised user to its specific appropriate
information and service type.
• Privacy (p): This KPI gives an organisation the ability to seclude
sensitive information about themselves and their users from
third parties. It involves the appropriate use, as well as the
protection of information.
• Maintainability (M): maintainability is associated with the mean
time to repair an asset and get it to work perfectly within a
specified period of time. The time could be categorised as less
than a day, several days, one week, several weeks, month or
months and even a year.
• Conformance (CON): This KPI ensures that the assets such as
services meet with the specified standard.
• Accountability (ACC): This KPI gives an assurance that an actor
will be evaluated on their performance or behaviour related to
something for which they are responsible.
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Step 3: Identify KPI weight: this step focuses on identifying the
total KPI weight for each asset. Measuring an assets KPI value
requires that numerous factors are considered by using several
criteria [6], such as economic impacts, financial impact,
operational impact etc. The criteria represent factors against which
asset criticality is measured and distinguish those assets whose loss
could have a significant impact on the objectives of the CI
organisation. Each asset is evaluated for all relevant categories and
therefore, the number of categories is restricted in a manner to
allow for feasible execution but still capture an accurate
identification of the overall criticality. To get the total KPI weight
for each asset, sum the total value together as shown in the
equation below
AKPIW = ∑
i = 1
n
KPIi (1)
where AKPIW = Total KPI weight value for each asset, i = 1–10,
KPIi = KPI value for each asset (see Table 1 for results). 
Task 1B: Determine asset criticality: criticality is the major
indicator used to determine the importance of the assets to the CI
organisation. This task focuses on combining the weight of an asset
KPI by the total number of assets to derive the criticality level of
the asset. With the growing threats and possible vulnerabilities, the
need to protect our critical assets is vital, especially to ensure a
well-functioning national CI. There is no standard way of
combining information to determine which asset is more important
than the other asset. The protection of all critical assets is almost
impossible in practice due to resource limitations and budgetary
constraints. Thus, with an effective identification of the most
critical assets that allows ranking, it is possible to focus on those
assets that, if disrupted, could have a serious impact on national
security, public health and safety, and business continuity. Assets
criticality is determined based on the assets total KPI weight score
by the total number of assets. To separate assets based on
criticality, a table considering five different categories of criticality
are assigned a weighted score between zero and ten in Table 2 
Equation (2) is designed to help an organisation categorise its
most critical asset based on a subjective judgment by the
stakeholders and other parameters used within the organisation.
The total value for each assets KPI weight is summed up and
divided by the total number of assets.
Ac =
KKPIW
An
(2)
where Ac = asset criticality, AKPIW = total KPI weight value for
each asset, An = Total no of assets.
Taking the running example presented in Section 3, the below
section demonstrates how asset criticality is derived. If software's
total KPI weight is 30 and the total number of software assets is 5,
AC is derived as
Ac =
30
5 = 6.00
Hence, the asset critical score for the software in the example is
‘6.00 = medium’ which means the asset is highly critical to the
organisation, and that any negative impact can lead to severe
damage not just to the organisation, but also to the public.
Task 1C – Asset Inventory: this task takes the results from the
previous tasks and provides an asset inventory by structuring assets
in terms of criticality. The asset inventory is then, in the next
activity (Section 4.2.2), used as input to the vulnerability and threat
assessment. The table below shows an asset inventory of the most
critical assets of the CI Organisation in the running example (see
Table 3 for results). 
4.2.2 Activity 2 – identification of vulnerability and threat
assessment: An essential part of a risk management process is to
determine the vulnerability of a system or an asset and the
consequence of potential threats [13]. This activity focuses on
identifying vulnerabilities, causes, and consequences of threats,
types of threats, cascading effects of threats, and how these might
affect the system and its assets. Evaluating the level of risk posed
by a system or an asset also requires an understanding of threats
and vulnerabilities and the inherent uncertainties. Fig. 2 shows a
conceptual overview of activity 2. In the following tasks, this
activity is demonstrated using the running example where the focus
is on cyber incidents targeting the critical assets of the example
power grid.
Task 2A: Identify Vulnerability: this task identifies
vulnerabilities on the most critical assets identified in Activity 1.
Vulnerability identification could follow different techniques, but
in this example, a checklist of all possible vulnerabilities associated
with each critical asset is used to identify vulnerabilities. The
vulnerability is an exposure to security that results in the weakness
of a critical asset allowing for the compromise of any of the
security objectives properties (confidentiality, integrity, and
availability) [27]. It can also be defined as the measure of the
susceptibility of a system to threat [13]. Identification and
assessing vulnerability is an important and delicate task that has an
impact on the successful operation of assets that provide CI
services. This task will present a model and then apply the model
to the example power Grid (running example). Identifying
vulnerability is an active strategy for improving infrastructure
security and provides vital information which can be used to
conduct a risk analysis in the next activity. It also helps in
controlling cyber-attacks and strengthens security in the weak
points of a CI that leads to a serious impact on its critical asset.
There are several ways in which an attacker can exploit
vulnerabilities in CI systems, and therefore causing severe damage,
Fig. 2  Metamodel
 
Fig. 3  Asset categorisation
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from an attacker only being able to view information to a worst-
case scenario. Regardless of the vulnerability discovered, the
attacker could have little or complete control over the system and
any action taken is referred to as a cyber-attack. The below table is
a summary checklist of the possible vulnerabilities found in the
critical assets of the running example. Note that the list does not
represent an exhaustive list of all the vulnerabilities because it
changes over time, for example, due to environmental or technical
changes. In this example, the checklist of vulnerabilities from [28]
is used for illustrative purposed. This checklist structures
vulnerabilities into categories such as software, hardware, data,
SCADA systems, communication, and network (Table 4). 
To simplify the vulnerability identification it is divided into
multiple steps, including evaluating various locations of an
attacker, vulnerability weight based on cascading vulnerabilities
effects, and evaluation of how vulnerability can affect different
assets thus leading to a threat on the asset.
Step 1 – Vulnerability Impact (VI) Rating: the impact of
vulnerabilities on critical assets is assigned using a vulnerability
rating (VR) score of VR.1–VR.5, from very high to very low. In
the case of multiple vulnerabilities, each vulnerability is assessed
and given a rating score. Description of the various levels of VR is
explained in Table 5. 
Step 2 – Asset VI Assessment Model (A-VIAM): this step
determines the VI of an asset by using A-VIAM which is built
upon a mathematical multi-value theory and structured as a value
model [29]. To demonstrate the A-VIAM model, it is applied to the
running example. The total impact value of all the critical assets
(ACs) components is summed together and divided by the total
number of critical assets considered to derive the vulnerability
level of the entire system as shown in (3) and (4). For example, the
vulnerabilities identified for a software asset in the running
example, the VR score is assigned based on its impact on the
software critical asset. All the VR are then summed together to get
an impact value for the Software asset and then divided by the total
number of vulnerabilities identified. The same method is applied to
each identified critical asset. The calculation of the A-VIAM
model is shown below
VIAC = ∑
VRi = 1
n VVRi + VVRi +⋯+ nVRn
Vn
(3)
where VIAC = VI for each critical asset, Vn = total no of
vulnerabilities, VR 1–5, i = 1–n.
Table 1 Asset KPI weighting
Asset category Subcategory C A I CON R AUT P M ACC ATH KPI weight
software assets microsoft office 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
mail server software 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 9
master boot files 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 7
windows operating systems 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 7
UPS remote management interface 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
hardware assets computer systems 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 6
data assets customer files 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 6
database files 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 8
intellectual property 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
personal data 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
network information 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5
emails 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 5
legitimate credentials 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
admin passwords 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
SCADA systems industrial control systems (ICS) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 7
HMI computers 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 7
remote terminal unit (RTU) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 6
production ICS network 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 7
ICS specification 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
SCADA database software 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 8
programmable logic controllers (PLC) 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
industrial software application and windows 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5
substations Ethernet devices 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
workstation 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 7
information and communication networks company's computer network 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 7
virtual private network 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
router/modem/ switches 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
firewalls 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
website 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
remote access services 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5
mail server 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
 
Table 2 Criticality levels
Critical level Weight Description
extreme 8.00-10.0 extremely critical and is of high value to the CI organisation, requires an extreme level of protection
high 6.00–7.99 high importance to the organisation and requires a high level of protection.
medium 4.00–5.99 the asset is moderately important to the organisation and requires moderate protection
low 2.00–3.99 the asset is of minimal importance and does not require many levels of protection
very low 0.01–1.99 the asset non-critical and requires a very low level of protection
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Score range = 1.00–10.0 for each vulnerability associated with
the critical asset; 1.0–3.99 (low), 4.00–6.99 (medium), 7.00–10.0
(high).
To demonstrate the VI assessment, assume there are three
vulnerabilities (V3.1, V3.2, and V3.4) from the checklist presented
in Table 6. The impact is by following (3)
VIAC = V3.14 + V3.23 + V3.44 = 11/3 = 3.67
In this case, the VI of the software asset is low, therefore there
is little possibility of a threat occurring.
To calculate the VI of an entire system, the total VI of each
critical asset VIAC is summed together and divided by the total
asset as
VIS = ∑
VIACi = 1
n VIACi + VIACi +⋯+ VIn
An
(4)
where VIS = VI for entire system, VIAC = VI for each critical asset,
An = Total no of assets where i–1 to n, vulnerability range = 10–
100%, where 10% (low) 100% (very high) (Table 7). 
Task 2B – Identify Threats: this task identifies the possible
threats affecting a CÍs ability to deliver its services. CIs can be
remotely controlled over the internet by the implementation of IT
systems. This implementation of IT systems on CI and the
interconnection between them have given room for cyber threats
leading to security concerns. Threats such as the denial of service
or malware attacks are famous threats to CIs causing security
challenges to the interconnected devices [24]. This task also looks
at the different threats that affect critical assets, therefore, creating
the occurrence of a risk or risks.
4.2.3 Activity 3 – cascading vulnerabilities and risk: Accurate
risk identification is essential for any critical infrastructure
organisation. Our approach identifies and evaluates the critical
assets, related vulnerabilities, and threat that could lead to risk.
Vulnerability is defined as weakness in an asset, exploited by a
threat actor who is either an individual, organisation, or a group
executing a program with the intention of compromising the
security objectives (KPI) of a vulnerable asset. This leads to a
threat of the CI organisation and causes risk to the overall business
continuity. For this reason, we have carefully considered analysing
the interdependency among assets, it's likely vulnerability, a threat
as a result of the exploited vulnerability and risk to the overall
organisation which is known as cascading impact. This activity
considers the decision tree model for risk identification due to the
cascading dependency among vulnerability, threat, and assets. The
first step of this activity is to determine the cascading
vulnerabilities and their link with the assets. The second step
focuses on the identification of the risks.
Step 1 – Identify Cascading Vulnerabilities: at this stage, it is
necessary to determine the cascading vulnerabilities and their
dependency on the assets. The cascading vulnerabilities occur
when vulnerabilities are linked with each other to cause a threat as
shown in Fig. 4. The impact of threat is higher in case of such
occurrence and cause severe damage to assets and the CI
organisation. Considering the running example, the power grid is
attacked due to the following vulnerabilities allowing a computer
worm to compromise each host and contributed to a successful
attack 
• Insufficient security hardening of computers rendering them
unable to withstand any form of attack, therefore, leading to
Table 3 Asset identification, e.g. power grid (CI)
Asset category Sub-category KPI weight (1) (2) Asset criticality
score
Critical level
software assets microsoft office 4 30 30/5 6.00 high
mail server software 9
master boot files 7
windows operating systems 7
UPS remote management interface 3
hardware assets computer systems 6 6 6/1 6.00 high
data assets customer files 6 36 36/8 4.50 medium
database files 8
intellectual property 2
personal data 4
network information 5
emails 5
legitimate credentials 3
admin passwords 3
SCADA systems industrial control systems (ICS) 7 56 56/10 5.60 medium
HMI computers 7
remote terminal unit (RTU) 6
production ICS network 7
ICS specification 3
SCADA database software 8
programmable logic controllers (PLC) 3
industrial software application and windows 5
substations Ethernet devices 3
workstation 7
information and communication networks company's computer network 7 34 34/7 4.86 medium
virtual private network 4
router/modem/ switches 6
firewalls 2
website 4
remote access services 5
mail server 6
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• Gaining access to the network and due to lack of network
segmentation, there is a successful compromise of the network
causing more hosts than necessary to be attacked.
• When the network is hijacked, sensitive organisations
information is susceptible for loss, theft, or damage. Inadequate
response and recovery plan is not always well established to
effectively restore operations and lost data. In the running
example, the organisation was not able to deal with the worm
outbreak at the initial response and the various stages during
recovery.
• Insufficient employee security awareness training is also another
vulnerability that could make an attack successful. In the
running example, employees were not aware of the incidents in
progress and that simple unintentional action can void the most
demanding security measures.
All these vulnerabilities contribute to the opportunity and
success of an undirected attack against the example CI. Fig. 5
shows cybersecurity attack scenario through one vulnerability
cascades to influence other vulnerabilities which leads to a threat
Table 4 Vulnerability checklist [28]
Assets affected Potential vulnerability
1. SCADA systems V1.1 lack of security hardening
V1.2 buffer overflow
V1.3 cross-site scripting
V1.4 cross-site injection
V1.5 cross-site request forgery
2. communication and networks V2.1 misconfiguration of network
V2.2 failure to segment network
V2.3 data path interference
V2.4 unprotected network communications
V2.5 open physical connections
V2.6 single point of failure
3. software V3.1 buffer overflow
V3.2 weakness in authentication, authorisation, and cryptography.
V3.3. invalidated input
V3.4 social engineering
V3.5 technological changes
V3.6 design flaw
V3.7 file sharing
V3.8 lack of documentation
V3.9 no log out when leaving the workstation
4. hardware V4.1 unprotected storage
V4.2 insecure locks
V4.3 susceptible to dust and soil
V4.4 hardware design flaws
V4.5 outdated hardware change controls
V4.6 misconfiguration of hardware
5. data V5.1 deployment failure
V5.2 broken databases
V5.3 data leaks
V5.4 stolen database backups
V5.5 abuse of database features
V5.6 lack of segregation
6. people V6.1 disgruntled employee
V6.2 lack skills
V6.3 loss of key personnel
V6.4 insufficient training
V6.5 issue motivated interference
7. organisation V7.1 lack of DR plan
 
Table 5 Vulnerability rating table
VR score Criteria Description
VR.5 very high one or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset extremely susceptible to an attack. The
organisation has no capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat
VR.4 high one or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset highly susceptible to an attack. The organisation
has the low capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat
VR.3 medium a weakness has been identified that makes the asset moderately susceptible to an attack. The organisation has the
reasonable capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat
VR.2 low a minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the susceptibility of the asset to an attack. The organisation
has a good capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat
VR.1 very low no weaknesses exist. The organisation has an excellent capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat
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and have a negative impact on an asset or assets of a CI
organisation, which finally materialises into a risk. 
Step 2 – Identify Risk: this final step identifies the risk of the CI
based on the cascading vulnerabilities and the threat to the assets.
We follow the decision tree model to determine the risk so that
appropriate control can be identified. A decision tree is a tree in
which each branch node represents a choice between a number of
alternatives and each leaf node represents a decision [6]. Decision
trees are easily interpretable because the tree structure can be
represented graphically and we can follow branches down the tree
according to the input variables, requiring less processing time. It
also has the ability to assign specific values to problems, decisions,
and outcomes of each decision, this enables a single clear view of
all possible solutions. The reason for choosing decision tree
technique is that it provides a chain of events as a result of an
attack and significantly improves the ability of the organisation to
find new exploits in an asset and implement appropriate control
measures before it escalates.
We follow the cascading vulnerability and its impact on the
asset to identify the risks. In particular, the root node in our case is
the vulnerability which can exploit the threat as leaf decision node
as shown in Fig. 6. Vulnerability is considered as predicator for
risk identification. If the threat affects the critical assets then the
final decision is whether to accept the risk and undertake the
necessary control. The decision tree helps in our case to consider
the cascading impact which is due to an unexpected chain of events
caused by the action of a threat actor which affects an asset and the
organisation at large. They are extreme events in which the impact
increases in progression over time and generates a series of minor
events that eventually lead to a serious negative impact. Cascading
impacts are often caused by unresolved vulnerabilities in a system.
Cascading impacts is considered a complex problem in CI because
such events result in devastating consequences to other assets or
CIs [30] and as the interdependences of assets are sometimes
complex. The level of the tree depends on the cascading
vulnerabilities and threat which effect on the assets. 
Fig. 6 shows the underlying vulnerabilities that materialise an
attack; this depends on the skill and motivation of the threat actor
to gain access to the system or network. The tree shows that once a
threat actor gains access to any asset of the organisation, it is likely
for them to carry out an attack that can lead to a major risk. This
allows to predicate the high risks and helps organisation to
undertake the necessary control to rectify the weaknesses in
proactive manner. Decision tree demonstrates the cascading impact
of vulnerabilities and threats on assets in a simple manner so that
Table 6 Threat and vulnerability on CI [28]
Asset type Vulnerability types Threat types
hardware lack of care at the disposal theft of media or document
lack of efficient configuration change control error in use
insufficient maintenance installation on storage media breach of information system maintainability
software lack of audit trail abuse of rights
lack of proper documentation error in use
widely distributed software corruption of data
communication and network lack of identification and authentication mechanisms forging of rights
unnecessary services enabled illegal processing of data
unprotected communication lines eavesdropping
people insufficient security training error in use
absence of personnel breach of personnel availability
 
Table 7 A-vulnerability impact
Asset name Vulnerability type VR score (3) VI
SCADA system V1.1, V1.5 3, 4 7/2 = 3.50 low
software V3.1, V3.7, V3.9 2, 3, 4 9/3 = 3.00 low
communication and networks V2.1 5 5/1 = 5.00 medium
hardware V4.3, V4.4 3, 4 7/2 = 3.50 low
 
Fig. 4  Interdependency of assets
 
Fig. 5  Cascading impact
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CI organisation can understand which risks are important and
needs early attention.
5 Conclusions
Risk management is essential for any CI organisation for protecting
its assets. It is a continuous process of maintaining the effective
functioning of critical assets in any circumstance. One of the
critical steps of risk management is to understand the relevant
vulnerabilities and threats that could pose any potential risks. This
paper contributes towards this direction and focuses on three major
aspects of risk management, i.e. assets identification, vulnerability,
and threat assessment and risk identification. The approach follows
the decision tree model to identify the risks and necessity of control
based on the cascading impact of vulnerabilities and threat on the
assets. This allows predicating the high risks and justifies the
necessity of control in a proactive manner. The approach is
demonstrated using a running example from the SCADA system of
a power grid CI. The result from the running example shows that
some assets are more critical than others and identifies the
vulnerabilities and threats relevant to the context. The result of the
study indicates that decision trees are a useful tool for modelling
threats and vulnerabilities in a wide variety of systems. Future
work includes expanding the focus to analysing the risk of the
critical assets and to propose a comprehensive risk management
process for the CI.
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